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International experience in combating corruption is relatively easily identify the causes 
and single out the societies with high levels of corruption in their bureaucracies and 
private sectors. It is much more difficult to prescribe effective remedies and even more 
problematic to get new approaches applied in an appropriate and sustained fashion. 
This is particularly true with respect to the post-communist countries that embarked on 
the road of transition to a new economic and political reality over a decade ago. 
Making significant advances along this road has turned out to be much more difficult 
than expected at the beginning and has revealed risks and obstacles not anticipated. 
The article explores to what extent the task of containing corruption was on the agenda 
of public management reforms in these countries, the impact of these reforms on the 
level of corruption, if any, and seeks to identify more effective approaches for 
combating corruption in transitional states. 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the demise of the communist system many CEE (Central and Eastern 
European) and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries announced reform 
of their state administrations. The article explores to what extent the task of containing 
corruption was on the agenda of public management reforms in these countries, the 
impact of these reforms on the level of corruption, if any, and seeks to identify more 
effective approaches for combating corruption in transitional states.   
International experience in combating corruption shows that it is relatively easy to 
identify the causes of this “disease” and to single out the societies with high levels of 
corruption in their bureaucracies and private sectors, whereas it is much more difficult 
to prescribe effective remedies and even more problematic to get new approaches 
applied in an appropriate and sustained fashion. This is particularly true with respect to 
the post-communist countries that embarked on the road of transition to a new economic 
and political reality over a decade ago. Making significant advances along this road has 
turned out to be much more difficult than expected at the beginning and has revealed 
risks and obstacles not anticipated. 
From the perspective of this article, it is observed that in its many forms corruption 
exists everywhere -- in rich countries and in poor, in the public as well as in the private 
sectors, and in virtually all regions of the world. What varies among nations and regions 
are the extent and the prevailing forms of corruption -- and also the level of tolerance of 
society toward this phenomenon. To quote a respected source, “…corruption has been 
increasing in virtually all kinds of politico-economic system since the 1980s,” (Holmes, 
1999) and it is commonly recognized that corruption is wide spread in former 
communist countries. Since late 1980s corruption has grown considerably in dimensions 
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and in the variety of forms it takes, and at present it poses a serious threat to the 
democratic gains and the advance of public sector reform in these countries.   
A recent World Bank study of the corruption in the transitional countries points out that,  
In those countries where the problem is most entrenched corruption undermines 
the driving forced behind the reform. New firms are driven into the underground 
economy. Vital resources are siphoned off shore. Foreign investors turn away in 
frustration. As a result some countries risk of becoming trapped in a vicious circle 
in which pervasive corruption reduces public revenues, undermines public trust, 
and weakens the credibility of the state, unless decisive leadership can push 
through the necessary reforms (World Bank, 2000: 24).   
Apart from obvious distortion of economic activity, corruption increases inequality and 
hits the poor hardest either directly or indirectly, e.g., instances of squandered or stolen 
development loans. As Miller notes, “The state is cheated out of revenue by those who 
bribe officials, and consequently has to impose greater tax burdens on those who cannot 
avoid payment by bribing officials and/or let public services, on which the poor in 
particular depend, collapse.” (Miller, 2002).  
Furthermore, corruption undermines the rule of law, leads to double ethical standards 
and results in alienation of citizens from the state. At the same time, examples of 
successful anti-corruption strategies do exist (some of them are described below) and 
this fact should encourage developers and managers of future reforms to be consistent 
and resolute in their efforts in spite of temporary failures and setbacks.   
THE ROOTS OF CORRUPTION IN THE TRANSITION COUNTRIES 
It appears that corruption has reached new proportions worldwide (e.g,, witness the 
recent scandals in the US corporate environment with Enron, TYCO and other firms), 
but perhaps this perception is due to more and better media coverage of corruption. 
After all bad news sells better than good news. In the transition countries, corruption 
has become generally less risky because it has become institutionalized, leading to 
increased public cynicism about the power of new governments to stop it. Corruption 
also has become more cash-oriented to avoid detection and taxation and, as a result of 
cartel formation and mergers, has become more profitable. This reminds one of what 
has happened since 1980 in the worldwide illegal drug business, despite a U.S. led 
international “war on drugs”, e.g., from Columbia to Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. In 
some transition countries corruption is so institutionalized that it has become the norm 
to the extent that market have developed for monopoly operation of formerly state-
owned enterprises, portfolios and services. As many former government officials, 
government appointees and civil servants have become involved in management of 
commercial activities, some of these entities have grown strong enough to define state 
policy at least in certain areas.  
 
In Russia, for example, rights to operate some monopolies were essentially distributed 
as political “spoils” during economic transition in the early 1990s to former high 
ranking government officials and prominent businessmen. This action essentially 
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guaranteed that no real markets would develop for provision of many services, i.e., 
markets for services will not develop and an absence of competition will prevent 
production of promised consumer benefits. 
EXPLAINING THE PREVALENCE OF CORRUPTION 
There are many reasons for the upsurge of corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The legacy of the past -- not only that of the communists – but originating further back 
in history, e.g. from Austrian-Hungarian empire or tsarist Russia) explains to a 
considerable extent a long-term departure from ethical standards of good governance, 
accountability, transparency and the steady movement toward private rent seeking in the 
bureaucracy, and continuing domination by the state in the economy sotypical of the 
former command structures. This is combined with a deeply rooted bureaucratic 
mentality of treating citizens as “inferiors”. Furthermore, citizens have been conditioned 
to wait for the state to tell them what to do as producers and consumers, particularly the 
older generations that grew up under communist regimes.  
Economic decline and uncertainty has been produced political instability. Poverty and 
low salaries of civil servants as well as low job security in particular for high-level 
officials feeds large-scale corruption. At the same time, political and economic 
instability, along with a lack of clear, stable rules, reduces the planning horizons of 
market agents and induces them to undertake the risks of unlawful deals with 
government officeholders in pursuit of beneficial pay-offs. 
Shortage of appropriate legislation and, what is more important, poor, if any, 
enforcement of the existing laws and norms complicates the situation in these natiions. 
Legal reforms fail to meet the rapidly expanding and evolving demand for rules to 
support and regulate the emerging market economies and civil societies.  
Weak and inefficient state bureaucracy of previous regimes aim to survive transition 
and spares no efforts to insure its self-preservation. Under these conditions the state 
fails to provide the rule of law and other mandated public inputs and services. Again, 
legitimate businesses, who are denied officially protection of their rights, seek “special” 
relations with government officials to stay in operation. 
Undeveloped civil society and weakness or lack of democratic traditions is an 
underlying cause of corruption. Socio-economic crisis leads to common frustration with 
the inability of the state to perform its basic functions, resulting in even greater 
alienation of citizens from the government. Low respect for the rule of law undermines 
attempts to create effective safeguards against corruption.  
All of this has created favorable conditions for the emergence or continuation of various 
types of corruption. Furthermore, these “traditional” stimuli for corruption have been 
complemented by new opportunities for corrupt behavior that have emerged following 
collapse of the repressive but somewhat effective command-and-control structures in 
the CEE and CIS countries. The establishment of new political and economic 
institutions was accompanied by massive redistribution of state assets and thus created 
favorable conditions for administrative corruption. New horizons for embezzlement and 
graft opened up with the launch of privatization, lessened control of exports and 
imports, and the expansion of the shadow economy. In some extreme but far from 
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exceptional cases, state officials sold off state assets to themselves, at prices 
considerably below what the market would have defined.  
For example, it is estimated that in the early 1990s in Russia, approximately 30% of all 
decisions on privatization were taken in violation of the existing legislation and 
normative tenets. (INDEM, 1998.) Attempts to pass anticorruption laws and have them 
adequately enforced have been attempted regularly since 1993 but, so far, with little or 
no success. The annual damage to the Russian state budget and economy caused by 
corruption is estimated at around $16 billion (Ustinov, 2001).  
The demise of the communist system also meant that the former "master", the 
communist party, which exercised strict control over conduct of its members and 
citizens, disappeared, but a new regime, one of democratic institutions, was not strong 
enough to effectively make the bureaucracy serve the democratic state and the people. 
While appropriate legislation, control and accountability were virtually absent, resource 
allocation has remained in the hands of government officials, who in most cases decided 
on their own which strategic enterprises were to be privatized, the rules for purchasing 
them, and in some cases who would win new ownership rights -- although typically 
such decisions were made by political insiders and not bureaucrats..  
In addition, corruption in the post-communist countries has been to a considerable 
extent generated by old customs and views. Due to the persistent tradition of patronage 
(inherited from the pre-communist and communist times) the state is still considered by 
high-ranking officials and citizens as the main actor in resource allocation, and also as a 
patron dealing with a select clientele. Therefore, many bureaucrats find it difficult to 
draw a clear line between public and private domains and, consequently, are complicit 
with corrupt practices.  
AN ALGORITHM TO EXPLAIN CORRUPTION AND POTENTIAL CURES 
A well-known formula to explain corruption is: C = M + D - A (corruption equals 
monopoly plus discretion, minus accountability). This formulation adequately reflects 
the origin of corruption, in particular in post communist states. From the view of Robert 
Klitgaard, Dean of the Rand Graduate School in the USA and a highly regarded scholar 
in the field of corruption, “…whether the activity is public, private or non-profit, and 
whether it is carried out in Ouagadougou or Washington, one will tend to find 
corruption when an organization or person has a monopoly power over a good or 
service, has the discretion to decide who will receive it and how much that person will 
get, and is not accountable.” (Klitgaard, 1998: 24). In his view combating corruption, 
therefore, begins with improving public management systems. Monopolies must be 
reduced, or be carefully regulated. Official discretion must be clarified. Transparency 
must be enhanced. The probability of getting caught must increase, and the penalties for 
corruption for both givers and takers must rise.  
One may conclude, quite justifiably, that it is easy to declare these objectives, but it is 
much more difficult to achieve them in practice. This is particularly true, if we consider 
countries with a relatively high degree of political instability, economic turmoil, 
undeveloped institutional frameworks and weak civil societies and traditions. 
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In the end, corruption comes down to two dimensions -- people and opportunity. As 
highlighted at the First Global Forum on Fighting Corruption (February 1999), about 
90% of corruptive behavior has everything to do with the opportunity to corrupt. 
Changing the public mentality also is important. However, these things take time and 
effort, whereas curtailing some opportunity can be achieved in a relatively short period 
of time and with relatively limited resources. Furthermore, less opportunity produces a 
different environment. The latter in turn fosters a different mentality in governmen t, 
business and society. Therefore, the priority objective is to diminish opportunities for 
corruption through a change in some of the incentives that stimulate it.  
There exists a close link between opportunity and patterns of government and 
governance. Rose-Ackerman explains that the nature of corruption depends both on the 
organization of government and on the power of individuals. These two elements are 
rooted in the patterns of government and governance and directly affect the scope of 
opportunities for corrupt behavior. Patterns of government and governance can be 
improved, in particular through carefully designed and consistently implemented public 
management reform. Within the framework of public management reform, opportunities 
for graft and embezzlement may be dealt with and reduced through enhanced 
deregulation, transparency and accountability (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). The example of 
Thailand may be one of success in this regard, but it is too early to tell. The Thai 
government has institutionalized anti-corruption measures through passage of law, 
creation of an anti-corruption court and stronger enforcement effort but the results of 
reform are not yet clear. 
Therefore, public management reform offers, "…new modes of action by new sorts of 
actors, in a joint effort to reveal, destabilize, and subvert corruption.“ (Klitgaard, 2000: 
48) This is particularly important in cases when corruption is endemic as in the post-
communist CEE and CIS nations.   
CORRUPTION AND THE PROMISE OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM 
In late 1980s and early 1990s of the past century the governments of CEE and CIS 
countries regarded political and economic reform as their obvious priority and placed 
this on the top of their agendas. Declarations to launch reform of public management 
were also made, but in most cases they reflected long-term intentions rather than 
immediate plans. In those states where such reform was actually undertaken, the process 
turned out to be fragmentary, incomplete and confined mainly to the adoption (versus 
enforcement) of a new legislation. In some cases, initiatives were limited to policy 
statements and strategy reports. The necessity for genuine public management reform, 
not just cosmetic measures, was realized in most countries later, in the second half of 
the 1990s. At this time, weaknesses of state institutions became apparent and its impact 
on slow progress of economic and other reforms in the region was evident. Countries 
that applied for accession to the European Union were subjected to pressure from 
Brussels to speed up improvement of their administrative capacities to meet EU 
standards in this field, and this may have helped to some extent. But, it did little for 
non-applicants.  
The majority of countries in the CEE and CIS regions have adopted new legislation in 
the areas of public administration roles and standards of ethical behavior for civil 
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servants. However, the laws prove to be of little worth unless there exists a sound 
mechanism of their enforcement. In illustration, in 1992 the President of the Russian 
Federation signed a decree, “On fighting corruption in the civil service”, which 
stipulated in particular that every civil servant should regularly submit income and 
property declarations. It took more than five years and another presidential decree in 
1997 before this requirement started to be enforced (INDEM, 1998).  
In broad terms, reform of public administration in CEE and CIS countries has achieved 
little progress to date in addressing such basic issues as developing management and 
policy making capacity, defining appropriate accountability systems, creating 
employment conditions capable of attracting highly qualified staff, streamlining 
relations between politicians and career civil servants, and reducing opportunities for 
corruption. This is in particular reflected in the reports and dialogue of the European 
Commission (1997, 1998, and 1999) on the progress of reforming public administration 
systems in the country candidates for accession to the EU. These reports described 
fragmented and politicized administrations, rife with allegations of corruption, 
underpaid staff and high level of staff turnover in most states.  
As a rule, the anticorruption component of reforms was not distinctly articulated in the 
agendas of the above-mentioned nations, or at best it was confined to improvement of 
ethical standards of civil servants. During these period there have been numerous 
anticorruption “campaigns” in CEE and CIS countries launched separate from public 
management reforms. However, coordination with the latter has been generally weak, or 
non-existent. Many such campaigns were very ambitious, relied on untested instruments 
of enforcement in addressing the roots of the problem and usually ended half-way 
through the implementation stage, producing in the end less than modest results. At the 
same time even these rather modest attempts to constrain corruption exposed powerful 
opposition of vested interests. The accumulated experience demonstrates also that 
anticorruption campaigns frequently are used as an instrument to undermine the 
positions of political opponents, i.e., these initiatives become part of “politics as usual.”  
It may be concluded that there has not been a systematic and consistent effort made yet 
on the part of CEE and CIS governments to challenge expansion of corruption in their 
countries. As the Global Corruption Report 2001 indicates, “The region’s relative 
success stories in terms of reform -- advances and openness Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia -- have come far in the transition process, witnessing considerable corruption 
along the way.” (Transparency International, 2001). 
CITIZEN ATTITUDES TOWARD CORRUPTION 
Analysis of the 2001 Corruption Perception Index compiled by Transparency 
International (see Annex A), reveals some important facts and lessons. Such countries 
as Hungary, Slovenia, Poland, considered to be relatively more advanced in 
implementing public management reform within the former “Soviet block”, place 
higher on the list and therefore are assessed to be less infected by corruption compared 
to their neighbors. The only exception is Estonia, which has the best anti-corruption 
rating among CEE and CIS states, but has achieved, so far, rather average progress in 
reforming public administration. This supports the rather obvious conclusion that public 
management reform is only one of the factors that affects levels of corruption in any 
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country. In the case of Estonia, this may well be the product of the Nordic tradition of 
relative “immunity” from corruption, reflected also in the high ratings of Finland, 
Denmark and Sweden. Still, even in Estonia, instances of corruption by police are 
plentiful, e.g., in “looking the other way” on vice crimes and in corrupt enforcement of 
automobile traffic laws. Bribe-taking still is commonplace in a police force dominated 
by former “Soviet” security officials and police. This appears to be a worse problem in 
Estonia than in Latvia or Lithuania in fact, despite the CP Index scoring. 
Another survey on the corruption climate in eleven post-communist countries carried 
out in 1999 by the Institute of Market Research in Prague resulted in some interesting 
findings (see Annex 2). The survey actually confirmed that citizens of Central and 
Eastern European countries are extremely critical of the problem of corruption in their 
state administrations. An overwhelming majority of respondents believe they live in a 
corrupt state and that their governments do not want to take effective measures against 
corruption. At the same time, most people prefer to adopt an attitude of passive 
observation rather than that of active opposition in relation to corruption. According to 
the survey findings, Slovakia is the country with the highest proportion of citizens who 
consider living with corruption as absolutely necessary to lead a normal life. Close to 
Slovakia in this respect came Hungary and Czech Republic. These findings refute a 
commonly held regional stereotype, “the further to the East the more essential to give 
bribes.” 
The passive attitude of citizens of Central and Eastern Europe is very illustrative. To a 
considerable extent it stems from unfulfilled promises and numerous failures to contain 
corruption in these countries. One may suggest that unless this attitude is transformed 
into more active opposition, there is little chance for success of anti-corruption efforts in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Public apathy in Eastern Europe regarding anti-corruption 
policies, “…represents a formidable stumbling block.” (Cirtautas, 2001) Therefore, it is 
essential to achieve even partial improvements in this area to encourage people, toraise 
their hopes and promote changes in their attitude so they feel more empowered to 
support fights against corruption. However, without significant state anti-corruption 
reform, such change in public attitudes and expectations will not come to pass. 
CAUSALITY AND CONSTRAINS 
Is there a line of causality between public management reform and reduction of 
corruption? If we proceed from a logical approach we may assume that a more 
professional, well motivated, better educated and trained, more transparent and 
accountable state administration should be less vulnerable to corruption than a corps of 
poorly educated, badly paid and poorly motivated administrators constrained by archaic 
rules and norms and working in an unstable and elite clientele-based environment. 
“Post-communist countries that have implemented less reform are generally perceived 
to be more corrupt than those that have introduced more reform.” (Holmes, 1999) This 
assumption appears to be generally correct and it is reaffirmed by the findings of 
Transparency International and the World Bank. A report prepared by the World Bank 
based on the findings of detailed surveys conducted in Albania, Georgia and Latvia 
concludes that, “…anticorruption efforts should focus on reforming public policies and 
institutions.” (World Bank, 1998: 54) 
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The examples of successful anti-corruption programs in Hong Kong and Singapore also 
highlight the crucial role of public administration reform in tackling corruption, even 
when it is deeply entrenched. We should bear in mind however that “allergy” to 
corruption may come from factors other than successful administrative or economic 
reform, e.g., peculiarities of historical development or well rooted democratic traditions, 
e.g., as in Estonia..  
It is widely acknowledged that effective anti-corruption strategy should contain a 
comprehensive set of measures that go far beyond issues of organization, procedures, 
ethics and punishment. Recommendations advocated in particular by the World Bank 
are undoubtedly justified but, at the same time, as a rule are highly resources and time 
consuming, e.g., the WB states the need “…to target broader structural relationships, 
including the internal organization of the political system, relationships among core 
state institutions, the interactions between the state and firms, and the relationship 
between the state and civil society” (World Bank, 2000: 24).  
Typically, the political leadership in the region, even if it is highly committed to 
changing the existing situation, does not have eenough resources or sufficient support to 
implement a full-scale anticorruption program. As a body it is confronted with powerful 
resistance from vested interests. This is particularly true with regard to most CEE and 
CIS states. Therefore, identification of priorities in anticorruption strategy that are most 
likely to achieve progress in a few selected areas is crucial.  
Remarkable in this respect are the marginalist recommendations of the World Bank 
Office in Poland, “…it is not always practical to tackle the worst areas first. It can be 
more important to identify committed leaders in areas where practical results can be 
achieved, creating demonstration effects and raising the credibility of the anti-
corruption programme… ” (World Bank, 2001: 56). Such an approach is more likely to 
enable hope and gain needed support in the broader society and, hence, more useful to 
build a sound platform for further resolute and comprehensive actions. Something needs 
be done to show even small but exemplary results in the short run, to generate 
confidence that change is possible, to convince citizens of good prospects for 
anticorruption efforts and to encourage their participation. In societies where the state 
has led in the past, some evidence of “frying even small fish” will be helpful. 
Advocating a marginalist approach does not mean that larger initiatives are any less 
important. Rather, economic deregulation, reducing the discretionary power of the state, 
removal of excessive and non-value adding administrative rules, complemented by 
increased transparency and accountability and strengthened by attempts to build broad 
anti-corruption social and economic coalitions appear to be pivotal for achieving critical 
mass in the fight against corruption.  
THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP, DEREGULATION, 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY  
Managers of public management reform in CEE and CIS countries should focus on 
identification of “bad practices”, and “vulnerable” arrangements that create 
administrative barriers and artificial deficits of services by the state and facilitate 
“administrative blackmail” and other corruptive behavior. The powers of officials to 
exercise control and impose possible sanctions should be reviewed to assess their 
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vulnerability. Measures to reduce interference by the state in business affairs also 
should be considered. Particular attention should be paid to handling of public 
procurement and elimination of excessive administrative burdens, e.g., unnecessary 
licenses, permits, fees etc..  
An interesting illustration is provided by Timothy Fry, who, after having studied the 
business environment in Poland and Russia, advocates public management reform as an 
effective instrument for reducing corruption. His main recommendation is to curtail the 
discretionary power of the state bureaucracy. He compares Polish and Russian 
experience and gives an example of an average shopkeeper, who in order to open his 
business needs has to visit six different agencies in Moscow and four in Warsaw. After 
the start of business this businessman is inspected by various agencies on an average of 
nine times annually in Warsaw and nineteen times in Moscow. The key to the problem 
is apparent in Fry’s view – get rid of monopoly and introduce strict and transparent 
rules for operation and inspection (Fry, 1998: 31).  
On June 6, 2002 the Russian State Duma adopted amendments to the Criminal Code, 
which impose criminal responsibility for creating impediments to the legitimate 
entrepreneurial activities. From now on, unfounded refusal to register a legal entity or to 
grant license will be prosecuted by law (Rossijskaya Gazeta, 2002).   
In another example, until recently Russian traffic policeman were empowered to 
determine on the spot the amount of fine (within a certain range -- usually from $5 to 
$40) that should be imposed on drivers for virtually every type of traffic violation, 
depending on the “graveness” of misconduct. This created very favorable ground for 
graft. Recently the police have been largely deprived of this discretional power because 
precise levels of fines were fixed for almost every type of traffic violation. Still, some 
corrupt discretion still is present; only better training and hiring practices, increased 
professionalism and adoption of ethical standards of behavior will curb such practices in 
a comprehensive manner. And the importance of role of the public in objecting to fines 
that fall outside the rules cannot be understated. Some corruption can be prevented by 
direct citizen action – however, at some risk. 
In spite of some advances in the right direction made recently, the major anticorruption 
battles are still to come in CEE and CIS nations. In Moscow in May 2003, the issue of 
cutting redundant functions of individual ministries (assessed by a special commission 
to be approximately 500 functions) was discussed at a meeting of the Russian 
government. The event revealed that canceling even the 35 most obviously irrelevant 
functions turned out to be difficult as this measure met with strong opposition from state 
bureaucracts (Zvereva, 2003).  
Deregulation and removal of administrative barriers should be complemented by 
measures enhancing transparency and accountability. These are directed above all at 
introducing a clear-cut and transparent mechanism of decision making, regular briefing of 
public on the results of all investigations in the field of corruption and organised crime, 
ensuring greater public oversight in particular over fiscal management and administration 
of public procurement, taking appropriate criminal, administrative and disciplinary 
measures against persons involved in embezzlement and graft.  
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In most CEE countries, punishments of officials convicted of corruption generally remain 
soft. For instance, out of the 70 sentences passed in 1996 on Polish officials accused of 
accepting bribes, the most severe was two years of imprisonment (Holmes, 1999). In the 
opinion of Holmes, it could be argued that if officials perform a crude cost-benefit 
analysis, for many of them it is economically rational to engage in corruption even if 
they get caught and are found guilty. Obviously, such situation can hardly be defined as 
optimal if the CEE and CIS governments are serious about combating corruption. 
The role of media in strengthening transparency should not be underestimated. A major 
police corruption scandal in the city of Poznań, Poland erupted in March 1994 primarily 
as the result of a front-page article in the newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza. And a late-1996 
scandal concerning the Hungarian privatization board broke with the publication of an 
article in the economic weekly Figyelo. (Holmes, 1999)  
Related to the role of the media, the accumulated experience of formation of broad 
coalitions in some of the post communist countries deserves special attention. A coalition 
of this type in the Ukraine called “The Freedom of Choice” was established by several 
hundred NGOs in 1999 to monitor and trace possible campaign violations during 
presidential elections. The coalition continued its activities after the elections and served as 
a good starting point for better coordinated support of country-wide anti-corruption 
measures. (Sikora, 2002) 
It is noteworthy that the basic elements of approaches advocated here have been tested 
in an environment similar to that of Central Eastern Europe at least with respect to the 
scale of corruption. Lessons may be drawn from the South Korean experience, where 
bureaucracy was once widely acknowledged to be exceptionally corrupt. It is not an 
exaggeration to state that Seoul civil servants had often regarded abuse of their official 
positions as part of their “job descriptions”. A systematic approach to eradicate 
corruption adopted by the South Korean government brought about positive and 
relatively quick results. The basic elements of this approach consisted of: a) radical 
deregulation that led to the abolishment and revision of 80% of regulations that were 
unduly confining; b) introduction of internet based systems to monitor the real-time 
processing of citizen applications, accessible to everyone; c) strengthening partnership 
with citizens and NGOs, in particular establishing direct dialogue between citizens and 
city mayors; d) regular evaluation of the level of integrity of each administrative unit 
against an Anti-Corruption Index and introducing competition between government 
units (Rekhviashvili, 2002).    
Hong Kong and Singapore provide other examples of effective anti-corruption strategy. 
“Once among the world's most corrupt places, they have become two of its cleaner 
business centers.” according to Philip Segal. The keys to the success of anti-corruption 
measures among the “Asian tigers” consisted of strong commitment of top leadership, 
ensuring transparency, hard-edged law enforcement, exclusion of police from the 
reform process, and wide public participation and support (Segal, 1999). 
SITUATIONS OF SYSTEMATIC CORRUPTION 
Some clues to dealing with cases of embedded corruption have been described above. 
However, as Klitgaard notes, “When systems are so thoroughly corrupted, there may be 
little if any political will. Calling for better agents, improved incentives, better 
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information, more competition, less official discretion, and higher moral costs is well 
and good. But who's going to listen? Who's going to act? When corruption reaches this 
point, the usual anti-corruption remedies may have little traction.” (Klitgaard, 2000: 44) 
Klitgaard argues that “…when corruption becomes systematic, coping with it must go 
beyond implementing liberal economic policies, enacting better laws, reducing the 
number and complexity of regulations and providing more training, helpful though 
these steps may be.” He suggests that fighting systematic corruption requires 
administering a shock to disturb a corrupt equilibrium (Klitgaard, 1998). This may be 
appropriate provided there is strong support for the anti-corruption measures by the 
society and political opposition, which, as we know, is not always the case. Without this 
support the chances of failure are high and failure can move the whole process many 
years backwards.  
Therefore, more relevant is another argument by Klitgaard, “If we cannot engineer 
incorruptible officials and citizens, we can nonetheless foster competition, change 
incentives and enhance accountability - in short fix the systems that breed corruption.” 
(Klitgaard, 1998). Changing systemic and institutionalized practices in government and 
business that provide incentives which encourage and support corrupt behavior is 
essential. 
Leadership is essential in fighting corruption. A recent World Bank publication 
emphasized that, “…where state institutions with weak administrative capacity co-exist 
with a high concentration of vested interests and a state highly susceptible to capture, 
the problem of corruption is particularly challenging…in developing anticorruption 
strategy in the countries with systematic corruption it is critical to search for a feasible 
entry point to break the obstacles that prevent further reforms.” (World Bank, 2000) 
Leaders in government and business can provide critical entry points if they are so 
inclined. The World Bank suggests further that, “…efforts to build up demonstration 
effects through intensive work with carefully selected organisations, sectors or regional 
authorities might provide a method of entry into broader anticorruption work.” (World 
Bank, 2000) The approaches advocated by Klitgaard and the World Bank largely 
coincide with the views advocated in this article.  
Finally, there is one rather obvious consideration that, however, continues to be 
neglected in practice. As stressed at a recent meeting of OECD Anti-Corruption 
Network, “Outsiders can never fundamentally root out corruption for others. Rather, 
people and societies must create their own integrity and incentive systems for achieving 
good governance and reducing corruption. On the other hand, because outside aid can 
either contribute to corruption or be a positive force for its eradication, it is important 
that donor agencies design their efforts to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive 
impacts.” (Rekhviashvili, 2002)  
CONCLUSIONS 
Based upon the description and analysis of corruption in post-communist nations 
provided in this article the following conclusions may be drawn:  
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1. In 1990s public management reforms in CEE and CIS countries failed to 
achieve many of their proclaimed objectives. As a rule these reforms did not 
comprise a distinct anti-corruption component;  
2. CEE and CIS countries considered to be relatively more advanced in 
implementing public management reform are generally less afflicted by 
corruption than their neighbors with less advanced records of reform 
implementation; 
3. People in Central and Eastern Europe tend to adopt an attitude of passive 
observation rather than active opposition in relation to corruption. Unless this 
attitude is transformed into more active opposition there is little chance for 
success of anti-corruption efforts in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, it 
is essential to achieve even limited improvements in constraining corruption to 
encourage people to rersist corrupt practices, to raise their hopes, and to 
promote changes in their attitudes.   
4. Leaders in post-communist countries who have committed themselves to 
resolute actions against corruption often face evident shortages of resources, 
little stakeholder support and powerful resistance by vested interests. In such 
cases, implementation of a full-scale comprehensive anti-corruption program 
is problematic. The situation necessitates elaboration of a more marginal 
strategy aimed at changing the existing patterns and norms of governance and 
achieving progress at least in separate selected areas, i.e., picking and hitting 
targets that are achievable and that will have high visibility in the media and 
with average citizens. This is crucial for gaining much needed support of 
citizens and society in formation of a broad anti-corruption coalition;  
5. In most cases corruption is linked to opportunity. Reduction of opportunity, 
especially at grass root levels, as part of public management reform efforts 
may result in notable improvements and ensure greater public support and 
participation in anti-corruption programs. These improvements can be 
achieved through a focused policy of deregulation, reducing some types of 
discretionary bureaucratic power (e.g., that which permits petty rule 
enforcement without producing any value except to bureaucrats), removal of 
unnecessary administrative burdens on legitimate and legal free enterprise, all 
complemented by enhanced transparency and accountability supported by the 
media and anti-corruption interest groups and coalitions.  
 
Alexander Kotchegura, Senior Analyst, European Commission, and Adjunct Professor, 
People’s Friendship University, Moscow, Russia: akotcheg@online.ru 
 
ANNEX A 
The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index  
The 2000 C P Index Score relates perceptions of the degree of corruption by business 
people, risk analysts and the general public. Scoring ranges between 10 (highly clean) 
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and 0 (highly corrupt). Surveys Used - refers to the number of surveys that assessed 
country performance. Sixteen surveys were used and at least three surveys were 
required for a country to be included in the CPI. Standard Deviation indicates 
differences in the values of the sources: the greater the standard deviation, the greater 
the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources. High-Low Range 
provides the largest and smallest values of the sources. And, because of statistical 













1 Finland 9.9 7 0.6 9.2 - 10.6 
2 Denmark 9.5 7 0.7 8.8 - 10.6 
3 New Zealand 9.4 7 0.6 8.6 - 10.2 
Iceland 9.2 6 1.1 7.4 - 10.1 4 
Singapore 9.2 12 0.5 8.5 - 9.9 
6 Sweden 9.0 8 0.5 8.2 - 9.7 
7 Canada 8.9 8 0.5 8.2 - 9.7 
8 Netherlands 8.8 7 0.3 8.4 - 9.2 
9 Luxembourg 8.7 6 0.5 8.1 - 9.5 
10 Norway 8.6 7 0.8 7.4 - 9.6 
11 Australia 8.5 9 0.9 6.8 - 9.4 
12 Switzerland 8.4 7 0.5 7.4 - 9.2 
13 United Kingdom 8.3 9 0.5 7.4 - 8.8 
14 Hong Kong 7.9 11 0.5 7.2 - 8.7 
15 Austria 7.8 7 0.5 7.2 - 8.7 
Israel 7.6 8 0.3 7.3 - 8.1 16 
USA 7.6 11 0.7 6.1 - 9.0 
Chile 7.5 9 0.6 6.5 - 8.5 18 
Ireland 7.5 7 0.3 6.8 - 7.9 
20 Germany 7.4 8 0.8 5.8 - 8.6 
21 Japan 7.1 11 0.9 5.6 - 8.4 
22 Spain 7.0 8 0.7 5.8 - 8.1 
23 France 6.7 8 0.8 5.6 - 7.8 
24 Belgium 6.6 7 0.7 5.7 - 7.6 
25 Portugal 6.3 8 0.8 5.3 - 7.4 
26 Botswana 6.0 3 0.5 5.6 - 6.6 
27 Taiwan 5.9 11 1.0 4.6 - 7.3 
28 Estonia 5.6 5 0.3 5.0 - 6.0 
29 Italy 5.5 9 1.0 4.0 - 6.9 
30 Namibia 5.4 3 1.4 3.8 - 6.7 
Hungary 5.3 10 0.8 4.0 - 6.2 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
5.3 3 1.5 3.8 - 6.9 
31 
Tunisia 5.3 3 1.3 3.8 - 6.5 
34 Slovenia 5.2 7 1.0 4.1 - 7.1 
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35 Uruguay 5.1 4 0.7 4.4 - 5.8 
36 Malaysia 5.0 11 0.7 3.8 - 5.9 
37 Jordan 4.9 4 0.8 3.8 - 5.7 
Lithuania 4.8 5 1.5 3.8 - 7.5 38 
South Africa 4.8 10 0.7 3.8 - 5.6 
Costa Rica 4.5 5 0.7 3.7 - 5.6 40 
Mauritius 4.5 5 0.7 3.9 - 5.6 
Greece 4.2 8 0.6 3.6 - 5.6 42 
South Korea 4.2 11 0.7 3.4 - 5.6 
Peru 4.1 6 1.1 2.0 - 5.3 44 
Poland 4.1 10 0.9 2.9 - 5.6 
46 Brazil 4.0 9 0.3 3.5 - 4.5 
Bulgaria 3.9 6 0.6 3.2 - 5.0 
Croatia 3.9 3 0.6 3.4 - 4.6 
47 
Czech Republic 3.9 10 0.9 2.6 - 5.6 
50 Colombia 3.8 9 0.6 3.0 - 4.5 
Mexico 3.7 9 0.6 2.5 - 5.0 
Panama 3.7 3 0.4 3.1 - 4.0 
51 
Slovak Republic 3.7 7 0.9 2.1 - 4.9 
Egypt 3.6 7 1.5 1.2 - 6.2 
El Salvador 3.6 5 0.9 2.0 - 4.3 
54 
Turkey 3.6 9 0.8 2.0 - 4.5 
Argentina 3.5 9 0.6 2.9 - 4.4 57 
China 3.5 10 0.4 2.7 - 3.9 
Ghana 3.4 3 0.5 2.9 - 3.8 59 
Latvia 3.4 3 1.2 2.0 - 4.3 
Malawi 3.2 3 1.0 2.0 - 3.9 61 
Thailand 3.2 12 0.9 0.6 - 4.0 
Dominican Rep 3.1 3 0.9 2.0 - 3.9 63 
Moldova 3.1 3 0.9 2.1 - 3.8 
Guatemala 2.9 4 0.9 2.0 - 4.2 
Philippines 2.9 11 0.9 1.6 - 4.8 
Senegal 2.9 3 0.8 2.2 - 3.8 
65 
Zimbabwe 2.9 6 1.1 1.6 - 4.7 
Romania 2.8 5 0.5 2.0 - 3.4 69 
Venezuela 2.8 9 0.4 2.0 - 3.6 
Honduras 2.7 3 1.1 2.0 - 4.0 
India 2.7 12 0.5 2.1 - 3.8 
Kazakhstan 2.7 3 1.3 1.8 - 4.3 
71 
Uzbekistan 2.7 3 1.1 2.0 - 4.0 
Vietnam 2.6 7 0.7 1.5 - 3.8 75 
Zambia 2.6 3 0.5 2.0 - 3.0 
Cote d´Ivoire 2.4 3 1.0 1.5 - 3.6 77 
Nicaragua 2.4 3 0.8 1.9 - 3.4 
Ecuador 2.3 6 0.3 1.8 - 2.6 79 
Pakistan 2.3 3 1.7 0.8 - 4.2 
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 Russia 2.3 10 1.2 0.3 - 4.2 
82 Tanzania 2.2 3 0.6 1.6 - 2.9 
83 Ukraine 2.1 6 1.1 1.0 - 4.3 
Azerbaijan 2.0 3 0.2 1.8 - 2.2 
Bolivia 2.0 5 0.6 1.5 - 3.0 
Cameroon 2.0 3 0.8 1.2 - 2.9 
84 
Kenya 2.0 4 0.7 0.9 - 2.6 
Indonesia 1.9 12 0.8 0.2 - 3.1 88 
Uganda 1.9 3 0.6 1.3 - 2.4 
90 Nigeria 1.0 4 0.9 -0.1 - 2.0 
91 Bangladesh 0.4 3 2.9 -1.7 - 3.8 
Source: www.nobribes.org. 
Note: On the Bangladesh score, data for this country in 2001 was available from only 
three independent survey sources, and each of these yielded very different results. While 
the composite score is 0.4, the range of individual survey results is from -1.7 to +3.8. 
This is a greater range than for any other country. TI stresses, therefore, that this result 
needs to be viewed with caution. 
ANNEX B 
In June, July and August 2001 GfK Praha, a Czeck Republic-based Institute for market 
research, carried out a sociological survey on corruption climates in eleven Central and 
Eastern European countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, 
Austria, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Results of the survey are 
provided below in Exhibits 1 and 2. 
The level of corruption in the Central and East European region is usually estimated as 
moderate to very high, which casts an unfavorable light on the countries of this region, 
linking them to the position of the developing countries in Africa, Asia or South 
America. This assumption is underpinned by data from the index of corruption 
perception (CPI) annually published by Transparency International.  
The research project GfK does not conclude this assumption is untrue, but highlights 
major variances between the countries of this region. For example, corruption most 
affects everyday life of people in Slovakia. Almost half of the Slovak population feels 
that the problem of corruption is absolutely pressing, corruption is quite necessary to be 
able to manage private life – 48 % of respondents in this country answer that bribes are 
natural part of life in their country and this supports the view “those who want to live, 
must give.” Their figure highly exceeds the average in the whole of the region and thus 
Slovakia, in perception of corruption as absolutely necessary for people to be able to 
live a normal life provides an exceptional position in the region. Surprisingly, among 
these countries where corruption is perceived as very high are the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. A quarter of the population in these countries perceives corruption as 
absolutely essential in life. This finding contradicts the stereotype that the farther the 
East one moves in CEE and CIS nations, the more essential it is to engage in bribery. 
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Exhibit 1: The Corruption Climate I: Perception of Corruption  
 
  Source: GfK Praha, 2001. 
If the people living in the Central and Eastern European countries tell us that they do not give 
bribes, how come they live in corrupt states? The answer is very simple, it is not enough to 
passively resist corruption, but it is necessary to actively fight against it. The passive corruption 
immunity of most people does not guarantee that the remaining minority would not make the 
state corrupt. However, the active resistance of individuals to corruption around them is 
pitifully low in the whole of the region.  
The majority of the population living in the region do not perceive themselves as part of public 
control over adhering to generally accepted rules of state institutions functioning, and, speaking 
about a possible corruption behavior of clerks and politicians are more likely to take an attitude 
of passive observer than active initiator of their punishment. Obviously, the percentage of those 
determined to collectively fight against corruption is different between the individual countries. 
The greatest mobilization potential of anti corruption collective resistance exists in Romania 
and in Croatia, where the share of the respondents willing to demonstrate to support the fight 
against corruption comes close to two thirds of all respondents. Conversely, those least willing 
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Exhibit 2: Corruption Climate II: Personal Bribery  
 
Source: GfK Praha, 2001. 
Note: For further information see the GfK Praha website: www.gfk.cz/corruption  
 
REFERENCES 
Cirtautas, A. 2001. “Corruption and the New Ethical Infrastructure of Capitalism.” East 
European Constitutional Review 10/2/3: 18-20 
Frye T. 1998. “Corruption: The Polish and Russian Experiences”. Economic 
Perspectives, 3 (5): 2.  
GFK Institute of Market Research, 1999. Corruption Climate Central and Eastern 
Europe, Prague: GFK. 
Holmes, L. 1999. Corruption, Weak States and Economic Rationalism in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Melbourne: University of Melbourne, Paper Presented at the Princeton 
University – Central European University Joint Conference on Corruption, Budapest, 29 
October – 6 November 1999: 1-5. 
INDEM, 1998. Russia and Corruption: Present and Future, Moscow: INDEM.  
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 




Klitgaard, R. 1999, Combatting Corruption and Promoting Ethics in the Public Service 
in Transition: Enhancing Its Role, Professionalism, Ethical Values and Standards, 
Durban, South Africa: University of Natal.  
Klitgaard, R. 1998. “International Cooperation against Corruption.” SPAN, Sept/Oct 
1998: 38-39. 
Klitgaard, R. 2000. “Subverting Corruption,” Finance and Development. 37 (2): 2-3 
Miller, W. 2002. “Corruption and Poverty in Post-communist Europe.” Transition 3: 30-
32. 
Rose-Ackerman Susan 1999. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and 
Reform, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Rekhviashvili, I 2002. “Anti-Corruption”. Local Government Brief, Winter, Budapest: 
63-64. 
Rekhviashvili, I 2002. “Annual Meeting of the OECD Anti-Corruption Network”, Local 
Government Brief, Summer, Budapest: 61-62. 
Rossijskaya Gazeta, 2002. “News in Brief”. Rossijskaya Gazeta, 7(6): 1. 
Segal Philip, 1999, Hell of Corruption, IFC, Impact, Spring 1999, Washington DC: 5. 
Sikora I., ed., 2002. Anticorruption Strategies for Transitional Economies. Kiev: 
Vizkom. 
World Bank. 1998. New Frontiers in Diagnosing and Combating Corruption. PREM 
notes, 7. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
World Bank. 2000, Anticorruption in Transition. A Contribution to the Policy Debate. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
World Bank. 2001. Review of Priority Areas and Proposals for Action 2001, available 
from the World Bank - www.worldbank.org.pl. 
Transparency International, 2001. Global Corruption Report, available from the 
Transparency International, www.globalcorruptionreport.com. 
Ustinov, V. 2001. Meeting of Representatives of Law Enforcement Agencies. 
Rossijskaya Gazeta 62: 2. 





International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 





   IPMR The International Public Management Review (IPMR) is the electronic journal of the 
International Public Management Network (IPMN). All work published in IPMR is 
double blind reviewed according to standard academic journal procedures. 
The purpose of the International Public Management Review is to publish manuscripts 
reporting original, creative research in the field of public management. Theoretical, 
empirical and applied work including case studies of individual nations and 
governments, and comparative studies are given equal weight for publication 
consideration. 
   IPMN The mission of the International Public Management Network is to provide a forum for 
sharing ideas, concepts and results of research and practice in the field of public 
management, and to stimulate critical thinking about alternative approaches to problem 
solving and decision making in the public sector. 
IPMN includes over 600 members representing sixty different countries and has a goal 
of expanding membership to include representatives from as many nations as possible 
IPMN is a voluntary non-profit network and membership is free. 
   Websites IPMR:  http://www.ipmr.net/ 
(download of articles is free of charge) 
IPMN:  http://www.inpuma.net/ 
 
 
